Organized across individual choice and rationality, consumer and producer behavior, market equilibrium and efficiency, strategic interaction and information, institutional design, welfare and distribution, uncertainty and expectations, and empirical identification, this body of microeconomic theory synthesizes foundational principles into coherent analytical lenses, modeling frameworks, and testable implications. Use it to formalize economic intuition, discipline comparative statics, diagnose market failures, evaluate incentive compatibility, and design mechanisms that align private behavior with social objectives, while leveraging canonical models, equilibrium concepts, and welfare criteria to support rigorous reasoning, policy evaluation, and evidence-based economic design.
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Core Principles & Laws
- Diminishing marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
- Diminishing marginal utility
- Equimarginal principle
- Expected utility principle (independence axiom)
- Law of demand
- Law of diminishing returns (diminishing marginal product)
- Law of one price
- No-arbitrage principle
- Opportunity cost
- Pareto dominance and Pareto efficiency (Pareto optimality)
- Rationality axioms (completeness; transitivity; continuity)
- Revealed preference principle
Canonical Models & Frameworks
- Akerlof “lemons” model (adverse selection)
- Arrow–Debreu general equilibrium (competitive equilibrium)
- Bertrand competition
- CES (constant elasticity of substitution) preferences and production
- Cobb–Douglas preferences and production
- Consumer choice model (utility maximization)
- Contract theory framework (principal–agent)
- Cournot competition
- Edgeworth box
- Expenditure minimization and Hicksian demand
- Matching theory (stable matching; two-sided matching)
- Nash bargaining solution
- Prospect theory
- Public goods model (voluntary contribution)
- Screening model (self-selection)
- Signaling model
Theorems & Fundamental Results
- Afriat’s theorem
- Arrow’s impossibility theorem
- Berge’s maximum theorem
- Bondareva–Shapley theorem
- Brouwer fixed-point theorem
- Coase theorem
- Debreu’s representation theorem
- Existence of competitive equilibrium (Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie)
- First welfare theorem
- Folk theorem (repeated games)
- Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
- Kakutani fixed-point theorem
- Maskin’s implementation theorem (Maskin monotonicity)
- Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem
- Revelation principle (Myerson)
- Revenue equivalence theorem
- Second welfare theorem
- Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem
Empirical Regularities & Named Facts
Metrics, Indices & Decompositions
Methods & Identification Tools (common in this field)
- Backward induction
- Bayes–Nash equilibrium
- Comparative statics
- Concavification (information design)
- Contraction mapping (Banach fixed-point)
- Correlated equilibrium
- Duality (primal–dual; Legendre–Fenchel)
- Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
- GARP (generalized axiom of revealed preference)
- Incentive compatibility (IC)
- Individual rationality (IR)
- KKT conditions (Karush–Kuhn–Tucker)
- Lattice methods and supermodularity
- Monotone comparative statics (single-crossing; increasing differences)
- Sequential equilibrium
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
Policy Instruments, Institutions & Market Designs (as relevant)
- Boston mechanism
- Cap-and-trade (tradable permits)
- Combinatorial auction
- Deferred acceptance (Gale–Shapley)
- Double auction
- First-price sealed-bid auction
- Kidney exchange (Roth–Peranson)
- Lindahl pricing
- Nonlinear pricing (two-part tariffs; block tariffs)
- Pigouvian tax/subsidy
- Top trading cycles (TTC)
- Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism
Frontier / Emerging & Interdisciplinary Concepts
- Algorithmic collusion and pricing
- Algorithmic game theory
- Ambiguity aversion (maxmin; smooth ambiguity)
- Bayesian persuasion (information design)
- Behavioral welfare economics
- Data markets and data property rights
- Differential privacy in mechanism design
- Digital advertising auctions (GSP; VCG variants)
- Dynamic mechanism design
- Network games and diffusion
- Nudges and choice architecture
- Rational inattention